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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF FAIRNESS:
FREEDOM THROUGH REGULATION IN THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
.I'ichel Rosenfeld*

U

I.

INTRODUCTION

pon first impression, it may appear that political freedom is synonymous with a lack of externally' imposed restraints. One might
think that an isolated individual is free if no human agency interferes
with his choices and actions, in the sense that Robinson Crusoe was
free on his uninhabited island. But such freedom is unattainable for
one who lives in the society of other men. Even in a Hobbesian state of
nature, where power confers right and where law has no dominion,
anyone possessing the requisite power can frustrate the aims of
another, effectively thwarting the possibility of freedom for all by
creating an atmosphere of fear. From this follows the seemingly
paradoxical conclusion that there can be no real political freedom
without some form of governmental restraint,2 or in other words, that
political freedom cannot become a reality without the aid of the rule of
law.
That the constituted authority of government should, through the
promulgation and enforcement of laws, restrain some freedoms to
safeguard other freedoms deemed paramount to the common good is a
proposition that has gained near universal acceptance. Even John
Stuart Mill, the vehement foe of governmental restraints, conceded
that an individual could be rightfully restrained if his actions caused
harm to others. 3 Mill recognized that acceptance of the proposition
that governmental regulation is necessary for the preservation of
political freedom gives rise to the need to define the proper limits of
such governmental regulation. Too much regulation as well as too little
can ultimately eliminate the very freedom that is meant to be preserved. The difficult question is, what degree of regulation is ultimately compatible with political freedom?
*

B.A., 1969, -A.A., 1971, Columbia University; JD., 1974. Northwestern University School

of Law.
1- In speaking of political freedom we are only concerned with those external restraints that
can be imposed by men. Restraints of the type imposed by the laws of nature, though of great
importance to questions of metaphysical freedom, play no significant part in the realm of political
philosophy.
2. See S. Benn & R. Peters, The Principles of Political Thought 247 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Benn & Peters].
3. J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism; On Liberty, Essay on Bentham 135 (M. Warnock
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as On Liberty].

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[.
[Vol.
44

Mill's answer is stated in the
principle . . . that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection. . . . ITlhe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
4
others.

Unfortunately, although Mill's "harm principle" expresses a limitation
upon governmental interference with individual freedom, it provides
too vague a criterion to set the boundaries of such a limitation.
Although Mill proposed that the harm principle apply to a government
nearing the minimal passive model, even a proponent of a government
approaching the maximal active model could invoke the harm principle to control individual action, alleging that an abstract harm
threatened an equally abstract "common good" or "public interest."5
As the laissez-faire model of society, with its predilection for governments that govern least, gives way to increasing intervention into,
and regulation of areas previously considered beyond governmental
reach, it becomes imperative to reappraise the traditional concepts of
individual freedom. Have these concepts become obsolete as criteria
for the delineation of individual freedoms within the new social order?
This Article will analyze some of the implications of increased governmental regulation for liberal concepts of individual freedom, by
focusing on the government's extension of its regulative powers over
freedom of speech and freedom of discussion through the operation of
the fairness doctrine in broadcasting.
Although the study of a single administrative agency may appear
unduly limited, concentration on the manner in which the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regulates broadcasting can be
valuable. The administrative process itself provides a unique vehicle
for analysis in that, unlike the judicial or legislative processes, it has
no place in a laissez-faire government. 6 Also, though the average
citizen may never be a party to a lawsuit, nearly everyone is affected
by the administrative process in many ways on an almost daily basis.
Thus, the administrative process is likely to be the most frequent locus
of direct encounter between the individual and government. 7 At the
4. Id.
5. "Harm" itself is subject to such a broad variety of definitions that almost any degree of
governmental control, "from a minimal, passive government restricted to reacting against crimes
(harms') already committed, to a maximal, active government that controls as much as possible

of the lives of its members in the name of the common good, or the public interest, or the general
welfare," might be justified by an appeal to the principle. Gewirth, Political Justice. in Social
Justice 155 (R. Brandt ed. 1962).
6. See K. Davis, Administrative Law § 1.03, at 5 (3d ed. 1972).
7. Id. § 1.02, at 3.
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same time, because of its unique adaptability to the formulation of
precise regulations, the administrative process can be a most efficient
tool of positive government.
The range of subjects coming within the administrative process
extends from labor practices 8 to the wholesomeness of meat and
poultry.9 The regulation of broadcasting, however, can be singled out
as the only area of direct intervention by government into the daily
operations of a medium that primarily serves to disseminate constitutionally protected speech. Finally, although many of the rules, regulations and policies of the FCC may have some impact on the content of
broadcasting, the fairness doctrine stands out within the regulator),
scheme in that it was designed to promote public debate over the air
and to insure that opposite viewpoints be heard on controversial issues
of public importance. The fairness doctrine exemplifies an apparent
attempt by government to pursue the very ends which Mill thought
incompatible with the far-reaching activities of positive government.
II.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION OF FREEDOM

A. Political Freedom, "Positive" and "Negative"
Originally, to be free meant that one had certain legal rights and
duties that were contrasted with those of a slave. 10 In more modern
times, however, the word "freedom" has gained such widespread
political usage that it can be invoked to refer to anything from
surrender to the aims of a totalitarian dictatorship to the unrestrained
license to pursue one's every whim and desire. As a result of this
extension of its use, in the political sphere "freedom" appears to have
lost much of its force as a descriptive word, and has instead become
primarily endowed with a strong prescriptive power, enabling a
speaker to commend any state of affairs of which he approves, or to
condemn any state of affairs of which he disapproves. II This use of the
word "freedom" has had the effect of creating an aura of vagueness
around the very concept of freedom, severing it from those states of
affairs with which it had been traditionally associated. By virtue of its
detachment from any concrete instances, the concept of freedom has
become a useful and adaptable instrument of political manipulation
that has lost its usefulness as a criterion for political conduct.
To recapture some of the descriptive usefulness of "freedom," its
application must be confined within a delimited socio-political and
8. E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 160-61 (1970) (power of the National Labor Relations Board defined)9. E.g., Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §§ I et seq.. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq (1970)
(authority of Secretary of Health Education and Welfare).
10. J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy 4 (1973).
11. See Benn & Peters, supra note 2, at 230.
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philosophical context. Fruitful inquiry is possible once three variables
are determined: X, who is the subject of political freedom (for example, the individual, the proletariat as a class, a national group); Y,
from what the subject is meant to be free (for example, governmental
interference into the conduct of his daily life, his own weakness or
greed, economical exploitation by a privileged class); and Z, for what
purpose the subject is designed to be free (for example, to conduct his
personal life as he pleases, to escape from the alienation created by a
society divided along class interests, to reach his full potential unimpeded by weakness or greed). No matter what terms are chosen to
replace these variables there is a relation which must necessarily hold
between them for the sentence "X is free from Y in order to (be free to)
do Z" to be meaningful in the language of political philosophy. This
relation is that X has the requisite capacity' 2 and inclination' 3 to do Z,
and that Y is a condition, controllable by human agency, such that if Y
is in operation, X will be effectively prevented from doing Z.
Moreover, for any socio-political context at any given time Y may be
viewed in either of two ways: as an inherent and pre-existing condition
which has now become subject to the control of the constituted
authority and which can, therefore, become subject to removal by the
adoption of some affirmative course of action; or as a condition
previously put into operation by those in power, which can be removed by a simple act of repeal or by a simple refusal to make the
necessary provisions for its continued existence. Furthermore, in cases
where X finds no condition Y restraining his freedom to do Z, but
where constituted authority has the power to impose such a condition
Y, thus negating X's freedom to do Z, X can remain free only so long as
the government abstains from interfering in the area in question. In
general, where a particular freedom depends upon some affirmative
course of governmental action, it is called a "positive freedom." Where
it depends upon governmental abstention or upon governmental repeal
of a pre-existing impediment,' 4 it is called a "negative freedom."' 5
An example of positive freedom is the freedom gained as a result of a
government's promulgation of health regulations, and the expenditure
12.

This capacity may be quite remote, as in the case of an individual who, though capable of

eventual self-realization, is not presently capable of doing so because of inner impediments which

it is the task of constituted authority to remove.
13. This inclination may be abstract, and unconscious in each individual, as in the case of a
class or national aspiration not fully apprehended by its component members.

14.

An act of repeal, though technically an affirmative governmental action, is in reality the

formal expression of a decision to abstain from intervening in an area previously regulated. By

instituting an abstention, the act of repeal reinstates a negative freedom.
15. For an extended discussion of positive and negative freedom see I. Berlin, Two Concepts
of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Berlin].

19761
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of public funds to implement a cure for a crippling disease which
afflicts a significant portion of the population. 16 In this case the desired
freedom cannot be attained without some positive governmental action
which carries with it some legal compulsions embodied in the enacted
health regulations. In other words, in this case the acquisition of one
freedom can only be achieved at the expense of sacrificing some other
freedom. This poses a serious problem, for although it can be argued
that in our example the gain in freedom far outweighs the loss of
freedom, one can imagine cases where the contrary would hold true,
and where the government might impose an onerous constraint on
important freedoms in the name of opening the path to a new
freedom. 17
This potential for abuse accounts significantly for the classical
tradition of English political theory that interprets freedom to mean
primarily negative freedom. Emphasis on the negative aspects of
freedom helps to guard against the governmental abuses that can be
perpetrated in the name of positive freedom, but does little to map
boundaries between the areas of unrestrained freedom and those of
legitimate government concern.' 8 Furthermore, the absence of restraint in one area can by itself create restraint in other areas. For
example, in a society which enjoys an absolute right of freedom of
speech, some other freedoms, such as the freedom from libel, slander
and exposure to obscenity would be sacrificed.
In the abstract, negative freedom is not better or worse than positive
freedom, and neither should be viewed as an end in itself. Rather,
both should be considered as means to obtain certain desired freedoms
to the exclusion of other freedoms. Moreover, the decision as to which
specific freedoms should be provided or allowed to be pursued without
governmental hindrance, and which freedoms must be thwarted for
the common good cannot be made without taking into account the
particular socio-political end to be achieved. It is only after a society
defines the nature of the subject of freedom and the common good or
public interest sought, and determines which states of affairs stand as
obstacles to the realization of political freedom, that such a decision
can be made.' 9 And only then might it be possible to assess whether a
16. Although a crippling disease is a restraint imposed by nature, it becomes subject to
control by a human agency when men learn to exert control over it.
To introduce a more political
example, it may be figuratively said that for a Marxist. capitalism is a crippling condition which
prevents the proletariat from escaping from the servitude of exploitation and alienation, and that
the proletarian dictatorship is the positive instrumentality which will bring about the -cure" for
this condition and set men free.
17. Cf. Frankel, The Jurisprudence of Liberty, 46 Miss. L.J. 561, 564 (1975)
18. Benn & Peters, supra note 2, at 249.
19. It has been argued that there is a minimum of "negative freedom" without which there
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preponderance of positive freedoms or negative freedoms would best
serve the aims sought to be achieved.
B.

John Stuart Mill-the Need for a Free
Marketplace of Ideas
The liberalism of John Stuart Mill, with its emphasis on relativism,
has had a profound influence on the American constitutional approach
to first amendment freedoms. 20 This is best illustrated by the words of
the Supreme Court: "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market ....,,21
The striking affinity between this view of the purpose
of the first amendment and Mill's arguments in favor of freedom of
speech suggests that a consideration of Mill's concept of liberty may
provide useful insight into the philosophical assumptions that underlie
the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation.
Individual freedom, according to Mill, is the foundation upon which
rests the possibility of social progress. The individual must be the
subject of freedom not only because a decent society owes due regard
to his basic dignity, but because without individuality, society would
cease to progress as its potential for greatness became atrophied. 22 And
individuality itself disappears when the individual is no longer in a
position to make choices for himself. Ultimately, individual freedom of
choice is the sine qua non of human vitality and progress, because in
Mill's belief unless the mental and moral faculties are repeatedly used
in the making of free choices, they remain underdeveloped and weak,
like unexercised muscles.
The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity,
and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. . . .He who lets the
world .. .choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the
ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his
faculties.23

Thus, Mill adhered to the optimistic view that from the diversity of
can be no human dignity. If so, the point made still applies to all freedoms that stand above the
bare minimum. Berlin, supra note 15, at 161.
20. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964); J. Barron, Freedom of
the Press For Whom? 76 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Barron].
21. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); cf. Thornill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937),
overruled on different grounds in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). For Mill's view,
see On Liberty, supra note 3, at 141-83.
22. On Liberty, supra note 3, at 201.
23. Id. at 187.
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individual experience, and from the variety of free individual and
social experimentation, would emerge an originality and creativity
capable of guiding an entire society on the path to progress.
The greater threat to the survival of individuality came not from
government itself, but from the ascendency of public opinion in the
democratic state. Although government can muster the power to
destroy the negative freedom essential for the preservation of individuality, in the democracy of Mill's time it was the universal power of
public opinion, with its overwhelming tendency toward conformity,
that was seen as the most potent weapon against individuality.2 -4
Unlike the despot who thwarts individuality by imposing external
restraints, conformity reaches the "inner man" in order to stunt the full
25
development of his individual faculties.
To combat the stifling flow of conformity, men's minds must be
continually challenged by a diversity of opinion. Accordingly, Mill
insisted on toleration of all opinion, no matter how unpopular. He
maintained that "if either of... two opinions has a better claim than
the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and
countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and
place to be in a minority. '26 He accorded this preference to the
minority opinion because, in his view, that opinion "represents the
neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of
'27
obtaining less than its share.

As a utilitarian, Mill did not believe that truth was immutable for all
time, or that it could simply be deduced from reason. Rather, he
thought that truth emerged piecemeal from experience, and was not
likely to be contained in any one set of opinions. He pointed out that
no one was entitled to think that he possessed the whole truth, lest he
think himself justified in stamping out opinions contrary to his own;
truth most often came to light by virtue of the combination and
reconciliation of opposites. An opinion thought erroneous ought not be
suppressed since,
24.

Id. at 195.

25. "[S]ociety has now fairly got the better of individuality; and the danger which threatens
human nature is not the excess, but the deficiency, of personal impulses and preferences. Things
are vastly changed since the passions of those who were strong by station or by personal
endowment were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances, and required to be
rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security. In
our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as under the eye of
a hostile and dreaded censorship. . . . It does not occur to them to have any inclination, except
for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: . . . peculiarity of taste,
eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes: until by dint of not following their own
nature they have no nature to follow: their human capacities are withered and starved .
"Id.
at 190.
26. Id. at 175.
27. Id.
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though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a
portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or
never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of28adverse opinions that the remainder
of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

Perhaps most revealing of Mill's persistent aversion to unthinking
conformity is his argument in favor of free discussion in the hypothetical event that one opinion were to contain the whole truth. In such a
case, erroneous opinions must be tolerated because of their important
role in sustaining the vitality of the true opinion, by forcing the
proponent of the truth to justify his position. 29 What emerges as most
important for Mill is not truth for its own sake, but for the continuous
development of human capacities, without which truth itself becomes
a lifeless source of torpor and blindness.
Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the
discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be
scale of mental activity which has
closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high
30
made some periods of history so remarkable.

To protect the free flow of all opinions so essential to his conception
of a healthy society, Mill sought simply to keep the government from
intervening in the marketplace of ideas, except where authority had
the legitimate right to intervene to prevent harm from "inciting"
speech. 3 1 Underlying this position, which in substance places negative
freedom at the roots of individuality, is Mill's predisposition against
affirmative government, and his optimistic belief that individuals can
best improve themselves when left alone. Mill stressed negative freedom because he believed that man could obtain the individuality and
originality necessary for social progress without the intervention of any
external agency, and because he felt that positive government was
32
always ready to act in ways that bar individuality and originality.
28.

Id. at 180.

29. Without such confrontations, the true opinion would soon become a mere commonplace
and would "be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its
rational grounds. And not only this, but ... the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of
being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma
becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and
preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience."
Id.at 180-81.
30. Id. at 161.
31. Id. at 184. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
32. This conclusion was a product of Mill's view of history and his observations about his

own times. He found that tyrants, despots and social institutions had been prone to suppress
ideas perceived by them as threatening to the preservation and expansion of their powers. On
Liberty, supra note 3, at 149-59, 165-66. Mill found contemporary democratic governments to
function primarily as organs for the propagation of conformist mass opinion. Id. at 195.
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The notion of a free marketplace of ideas was of such paramount
importance for Mill that the negative freedom which sustains it
transcended the harm principle that defined the boundary separating
the realm of freedom from that of authority. To give the harm
principle concrete applicability, Mill classified individual actions into
two categories: the first, self-regarding and concerning merely the
individual, or at best having a remote and indirect impact on others;
the second, concerning others and somehow likely to have a direct
impact on their well-being. 33 With actions of the first category, the
state or society as a whole had no legitimate right to interfere. The
state could rightfully intervene in the second category if there existed
the likelihood of harm to the interests of others. Freedom of expression, although "belong[ing] to that part of the conduct of an individual
which concerns other people," 34 was nevertheless to remain unqualifiedly immune from government regulation, because it was "almost of
as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great
part on the same reasons, [was] practically inseparable from it." 35

Freedom of expression thus stands above the harm principle, or-if
one prefers to remain within the area in which the harm principle is
meant to operate-the benefits of a free marketplace of ideas are such
that no harm can outweigh them.
C.

The Emergence of Broadcasting's Positive
Free MVIarketplace of Ideas
Although in Mill's time the possibility of a free and self-regulating
marketplace of ideas may have been real, the communications revolution of our own century has foreclosed the realization of such a
possibility. In Mill's time, as in 1791 when the first amendment was
enacted, this marketplace was presumably open equally to all those
who could speak, write or publish.
Entry into publishing was inexpensive; pamphlets and books provided meaningful
alternatives to the organized press for the expression of unpopular ideas and often
treated events and expressed views not covered by conventional newspapers. A true
marketplace of ideas
existed in which there was relatively easy access to the channels
36
of communication.

With the emergence of broadcasting, however, those few who could
make use of the limited availability of the airwaves could effectively
drown out the voices of all to whom access was denied. A mere
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.at 135.
Id.at 138.
Id.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 418 U.S. 241. 248 (1974) (footnote ornitted)
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absence of restraints no longer could make entry into the electronic
marketplace of ideas a realistic possibility for all who desired access.
This new impediment, stemming from the very nature of the broadcasting medium, could only be removed by creating a new positive
freedom, whereby the government would be granted authority to
remove the impediment unforeseen by Mill. Such a course of action
would inevitably negate some of the negative freedoms previously
enjoyed by broadcasters. Congress adopted such a course of action
when it mandated that the broadcasting medium be used to serve the
'3 7
"public convenience, interest, or necessity.
Before reviewing the congressional formulation of policy in this
area., and analysing the operation of the administrative scheme, a
further reference to Mill is in order. Certainly, the proposition that
government regulation is necessary to ensure the existence of a free
marketplace of ideas would have horrified Mill. That in itself, however, does not establish conclusively that the ultimate ends which Mill
sought can never be achieved by means that include government
regulation. What is crucial in a free marketplace of ideas is a forum
that allows equal opportunity for all opinions, and not, a priori, the
means through which the forum was established. Mill notwithstanding, it need not follow that a government of limited powers cannot
regulate such a forum without thereby eventually destroying it. The
potential danger of establishing a positive freedom is not that it does
not promote freedom efficiently, but rather that by its very nature it
must sacrifice some freedom in order to establish some other freedom. 38 Since Mill seems to have held to the position that freedom of

expression is not limited by the harm principle, it should follow that
the benefits of a "positive" freedom of expression can clearly outweigh
the sacrifices associated with the loss of some other freedom(s). Finally,
although it is obvious that any regulation of broadcasting reduces the
scope of the broadcaster's freedom of expression, this need not constitute sufficient grounds to reject regulation, so long as the broadcaster's
freedom of expression does not become more limited than that of the
non-broadcaster. 39 Indeed, if one of the aims of a free marketplace of
ideas is to provide an equal right of access for all expression, the
broadcaster is not necessarily entitled to more access than the nonbroadcaster.
Keeping in mind this philosophical hypothesis as a possible theoretical justification for the congressional imposition of governmental regulation in the pursuit of a free marketplace of ideas in broadcasting, and
37.

47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970).

38.
39.

See Frankel, The Jurisprudence of Liberty, 46 Miss. L.J. 561, 602 (1975).
See note 168 infra and accompanying text.
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given the Supreme Court's view that "[i]t is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount
[and] [ilt is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is
crucial here," 40 we can proceed to consider the role of the fairness
doctrine in its attempt to promote the access of ideas over the airwaves
and ensure a balanced presentation of controversial issues in the public
interest.
III.

"FAIRNESS" AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

A. The Origins of the Fairness Doctrine
Although the fairness doctrine did not become incorporated into the
statutory scheme of the Federal Communications Act until 1959, 4 1 its

origins can be traced to the public debate generated by the collapse, in
the mid 1920's, of the regulatory scheme provided under the Radio Act
of 1912.42 Once it became apparent that a limit was needed upon the
number of persons who could be allowed to broadcast, legislators were
faced with the challenge of devising a regulatory scheme whereby the
existing frequencies could be made available for private operation,
while ensuring that the necessary selection process avoided favoritism
among competing applicants. Since it was impossible to provide radio
station privileges to all who desired them, it was decided that no one
would be permitted to use the scarce radio frequencies to promote his
private interests. 43 The public interest was to be paramount to any
40. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877. 953 (1963).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970). amending 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1958). provides, in pertinent part:
"Nothing in the [exemptions] shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the
presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of
news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of
public importance."
42. Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103-14 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 375-86 (1969); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-17 (1943). Houser, The
Fairness Doctrine-An Historical Perspective, 47 Notre Dame Law. 550 (1972); Robinson, The
FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation,
52 Minn. L. Rev. 67, 69-70 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Robinson].
43. That there is indeed a scarcity of available frequencies is a central assumption of Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 397 n.20, 399 (1969). But see Blake, Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the Emperor's New Clothes. 23 Fed. Coin. B.J. 75, 87
(1969); Comment, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the First Amendment, 27 Stan.
L. Rev. 1527, 1541-43 (1975).
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"right of selfishness. '4 4 It was necessary therefore to decide who was to
be entrusted with the responsibility of choosing which programs should
be aired. The then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, stated:
We cannot allow any single person or group to place themselves in position where they
can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to the public, nor do I believe that
the Government should ever be placed in the position of censoring this material. 4

Both the Radio Act of 192746 and the Communications Act of 193447
required that the sole responsibility for determining the form and
content of program material be left to the private licensee, and that in
making such determination he could not ignore the interests of the
public whom his license was designed to serve. 4 8 Congress specifically
rejected proposals that would have imposed an obligation on broadcasters to turn over their facilities to persons wishing to speak out on
public issues. 4 9 Instead, Congress provided that "a person engaged in
44.

67 Cong. Rec. 5479 (1926) (remarks of Mr. White).
45. Hearing before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1924), quoted in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 104 (1973).
46. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
47. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
48. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,416, 10,425 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Primer].
49. An exception to this is the "equal time" provision of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1970), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(a) (Supp. 2, 1975). Because politicians enjoy some
rights of access to respond to the views of their opponents, the licensee has less discretion in
dealing with access demands of politicians than he has when confronted by other segments of the
public. The equal-time provisions apply to candidates for political office, and operate independently of the fairness doctrine. However, the Commission has supplemented the equal-time
provision with some "quasi-equal opportunity" requirements under the fairness doctrine.
The Commission has held that where a station sells time to the spokesman of a candidate, or to
a group or an organization supporting him, and such time was utilized to urge his election, or
discuss campaign issues or criticize his opponent, then fairness requires the station to sell
"comparable" time to spokesmen of the opposing candidate, even when the politician himself has
not appeared on the air. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707, 708 (1970).
This ruling was extended in Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues v.
Republican Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970), where the Commission held that when a
spokesman for one political party appears in a program that is " 'person or party' oriented rather
than issue oriented," id. at 300 n.25, the licensee must grant the other party time in a
"quasi-'equal opportunities' fashion." Id. at 300. Basic to the quasi-equal time rule is the dual role
of the President as party leader and as chief executive. When the President wears his chief
executive hat he is a government spokesman addressing a controversial issue, and the fairness
requirements triggered by his appearance are those which apply to any ordinary case. On the
other hand, when the President appears on television wearing his party leader hat, then a
quasi-equal opportunity must be given to spokesmen of the other party.
Although the distinction between the President's role as the Chief Executive and his role as it
party leader may be sound theoretically, it is difficult to see how the two can fairly be separated
in actual practice. For example, recent FCC rulings that broadcasters could cover press
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radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be
deemed a common carrier." 50 To ensure that the broadcaster operate
in the public interest, the Commission was given authority to issue
renewable licenses, 5 l and to promulgate rules and regulations governing their use. 52 Any right of censorship was specifically denied.5 3
Congress intended "that the air waves be used as a vital means of
communication, capable of making a major contribution to the development of an informed public opinion."514 To effectuate this purpose, and to deny any one person or group the role of censor, the
statutory scheme struck a compromise between private and public
control of broadcasting. The private licensee retained control over his
conferences of President Ford and other announced candidates for political offices at all
levels of government without giving equal time to their opponents, but that equal time would be
due upon presentation of a public service message by the President on behalf of the United Way,
led Senator Proxmire to observe that "[t]he Government through one of its agencies has no
business making those kinds of decisions." 121 Cong. Rec. S20.308 (daily ed. Nov. 18. 1975). See
Comment, Presidential Politics and Political Prerequisites: The Application of Section 3 15 and the
FCC's Fairness Doctrine to the Appearances of Incumbents in Their Official Capacities, 39
Fordham L. Rev. 481, 496 n.124, 497 (1971).
The most serious consequence of quasi-equal time is the continuance of the communications
imbalance that presently exists between the executive and legislative branches of government.
The President can get prime time access on the three networks almost at will. while the networks
will usually not honor such a request from any other spokesmen.
In its 1972 Political Broadcasts Report, The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine, 36 F.C.C.2d 40 (1972), the FCC noted that the President's unique role in the American
political system made it inevitable that he receive more coverage than any other American. Id. at
46. The Commission refused to extend the "quasi-equal time" requirement to Presidential
appearances, stressing that any such action on its part should be left to the Congress. The
Commission stated that any increase in its regulation in this area would militate against robust.
wide open debate. Id. at 48. Commissioner Johnson disagreed, noting that the President h~s an
"overpowering advantage going into the -marketplace of ideas.' " over the party out of
power and the legislative branch. Id. at 56. In the absence of any significant voluntary
broadcaster action to rectify this unfairness, and given his view that Congress was "too political"
to take action in this area, Commissioner Johnson thought that administrative action could
appropriately restore some of the lost balance. Id. at 60-63. In any event, to increase political
debate over the air is not likely to result in any harm to the public interest. To the extent that the
networks tend to act as common carriers of the President's messages while retaining journalistic
discretion over the appearance of other government figures, an excessive imbalance will exist in
political debate over the airwaves.
50. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970); see Note, Fairness Doctrine: Television as a Marketplace of
Ideas, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1222, 1226 n.28 (1970).
51. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1970).
52. Id. § 303(f).
53. Id. § 326 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission
which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." See. e.g..
James G. Morris, 23 F.C.C.2d 50 (1969).
54. Fairness Primer, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,415. 10,425 (1964).
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station, but his freedom was mitigated by the responsibility to give
representation to the interests of the citizenry who themselves could
not be granted a voice over the air.
Before the articulation of the fairness doctrine in 1949, 55 the Com-

mission had in effect outlawed broadcast editorials. For example, in
Great Lakes BroadcastingCo. v. FRC,5 6 the Commission denied an application for modification of license because the licensee had broadcast
only one point of view:
In so far as a program consists of discussion of public questions, public interest
requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views ....

There is not room in the broadcast band for every school of thought, religious,
political, social, and economic, each to have its separate broadcasting station, its
mouthpiece in the ether. If franchises are extended to some it gives them an unfair
advantage over others .

. .

. It favors the interests and desires of a portion of the

listening public at the expense of the rest. Propaganda stations . . . are not consistent
with the most beneficial sort of discussion of public questions. As a general rule,
postulated on the laws of nature as well as on the standard of public interest,
convenience, or necessity, particular doctrines, creeds, and beliefs must find their way
into the market of ideas by the existing public-service stations, and if they are of
sufficient importance to the listening public the microphone will undoubtedly be
5 7
available.

Similarly, in Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 58 where the licensee
had promoted his own ideas and the political candidates of his choice,
the Commission observed:
A truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of the licensee ....
It cannot
be devoted to the support of principles he happens to regard most favorably. In brief,
the broadcaster cannot be an advocate.
Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to provide full and equal
opportunity for the presentation to the public of all sides of public issues. Indeed, as
one licensed to operate in a public domain the licensee has assumed the obligation of
presenting all sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively and without bias.
The public interest-not the private-is paramount. 9

In 1949 the Commission changed its position prohibiting broadcast
55. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
56. 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
57. Id. at 33-34. FRC decisions denying renewals of licensees who advanced their private
interests rather than those of the public were consistently approved by the courts. Eg., Trinity
Methodist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 685 (1932) (use of
license to defame Catholics, Jews, judges and others); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47
F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (licensee broadcast medical advice and prescribed his own preparations).
58. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
59. Id. at 340.
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editorials. Its study of the problem resulted in release of "Editorializing
by Broadcast Licensees, ' 60 which is the FCC's most comprehensive
articulation of the fairness doctrine to date. In essence, the Editorializing Report defines the role of the licensee as trustee of the public
airwaves. He is not free to broadcast as he sees fit, or to ignore issues
of public importance. 6' The Commission imposes an affirmative duty
on the broadcast licensee "to provide a reasonable amount of time for
the presentation over their facilities of programs devoted to the discussion and consideration of public issues." 6 2 The implementation of this
obligation carries with it a further affirmative duty to encourage and
afford reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting views
63
on all issues of public importance.
Although the licensee's freedom to operate his station is somewhat
restricted by these affirmative duties, the Commission made it clear
that the licensee was to remain the sole judge with respect to the
determination of the subjects to be considered, the different shades of
6
opinion to be aired, and the spokesmen for each point of view.
Moreover, in response to fears that the Commission's enforcement of
the fairness doctrine would inevitably draw it to take a stand on the
merits of particular issues, the Editorializing Report made it clear that
the FCC's role in this area would be limited to a consideration of the
licensee's overall program service, provided that the licensee act in
good faith and make reasonable determination as to particular issues.
"The question is necessarily one of the reasonableness of the station's
actions, not whether any absolute standard of fairness has been
65
achieved.
In the area of licensee editorializing, the Commission in effect
reversed its .1layflower decision. Noting that "the public has less to
fear from the open partisan than from the covert propagandist, '66 the
Commission reasoned that given the obligation to afford a balanced
presentation on issues covered by his editorials, the expression of his
60.

13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949); see Robinson, supra note 42, at 143. The 1959 Amendments to the

Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970), provide the statutory basis
of the fairness doctrine. The doctrine is explained in Fairness Doctrine Primer, supra note 48, 29
Fed. Reg. 10,416 (1964), and in Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine. 48
F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report].
61. 13 F.C.C. at 1247-48.
62. Id. at 1249.
63. Id. at 1250-51. See Obligations of Broadcast Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23
F.C.C.2d 27, 29 (1970) (duty to seek out appropriate spokesmen when none come forward); John
J. Dempsey, 43 F.C.C. 454 (1950).
64. 13 F.C.C. at 1251.

65.

Id. at 1255. See, e.g., Gary Lane, 39 F.C.C.2d 938 (1973).

66.

13 F.C.C. at 1254.
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personal views could not unduly interfere with the public's right to be
fully informed on important issues. Nevertheless, the Commission
cautioned the licensee that freedom to express his views on controversial issues did not justify distortion or suppression of "basic factual
fair and free discussion of public
information upon which any truly
'67
issues must necessarily depend.
Thus, use of the broadcasting media is structured around three focal
points: the general public, the private licensee and the government.
Their interrelation features a predominantly passive role for the general public, and an essentially dual role to be played by both private
licensee and goverriment. The public, intended to be the main beneficiary of the mass media, is denied any right of direct access to the
airwaves, 68 save in cases involving personal attacks, 69 and must rely
upon the mediation of the licensee for the propagation of its ideas, and
upon the intervention of the FCC for the redress of its grievances. The
licensee is both a trustee operating for the benefit of his audience and a
journalist operating much in the same manner as his counterpart in the
printed press. As a trustee he is answerable to the FCC, though as a
journalist he is presumably entitled to enjoy the liberties accorded to
the printed press. 70 For its part, the government acts as both guardian
of the public's interest and as the spokesman for its own interests.
Acting in its first capacity, through the FCC, it interprets and enforces
the "public interest" standard 7' and adjudicates fairness controversies
arising from complaints made by the public. 72 Acting in iis second
67. Id. "No discussion of the issues involved in any controversy can be fair or in the public
interest . . . in a climate of false or misleading information . . . ." Id. at 1255.
68. E.g., RKO General, Inc., 46 F.C.C.2d 240, 243-44 (1974) (licensee refusal to broadcast
religious program upheld); see Availability of Network Programming Time to Members of the
Congress, 40 F.C.C.2d 238 (1972).
69. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300, .598, .679 (1975).

70.

"Broadcast journalism is no less a part of the press--no less entitled under the first

amendment to show through such investigative journalism that substantial segments of society
are flouting a particular law ... ." WBBM-TV, 18 F.C.C.2d 124, 134 (1969) (documentary

dealing with college marijuana use). See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116-21 (1973) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). It was Justice Douglas' view that

television's rights under the first amendment should be the same as those of other media. Id. at
148 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment); see generally Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A

Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 Hastings L.J. 659 (1975).
71. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. III, 1973); Comment, The Federal Communications Commission and Program Regulation-Violation of the First Amendment?, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 826, 827-30
(1962).
72.
See Swartz, Fairness for Whom?-Administration of the Fairness Doctrine, 14 B.C. Ind.
& Com. L. Rev. 457 (1973). The Commission has recently made an effort to inform the public
of available complaint procedures. Broadcast Procedure Manual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
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capacity, through various spokesmen, it occasionally attempts to
73
influence the industry in furtherance of its own interests.
B.

The Controversial Meaning of "Controversy"

The FCC imposes on broadcasters the duty to make a "reasonable"
determination whether a given presentation raises a controversial issue
so that a fairness obligation is triggered. To illustrate that its standard
is not overly vague, the FCC has provided a hypothetical example: a
controversial bill is pending before Congress and the record shows that
the licensee has permitted advocates of the bill to use his facilities
while denying access to opponents. The Commission would determine
that the licensee had been unreasonable without considering the merits
of the bill. 74 The choice of this example is interesting, for it presents
the rare situation where the existence of the controversy and the issue
in controversy are self-evident. Furthermore, that the issue is one of
public importance is rendered evident by the very fact that it is before
Congress. Unfortunately, most real-life issues will not yield to such
automatic application of the reasonableness standard. Failure to comply with the fairness doctrine violates the statutory requirement that
broadcasters serve the public interest, 75 and may lead to revocation of
76
the license or denial of a renewal application.
A fairness complaint has a very limited chance of success, and the
remedy granted is usually mild. 7 7 The complainants' difficulties can be
ascribed to the Commission's application of the reasonableness standard.7 8 When a licensee denies that a given program presented a
controversial issue, the Commission must determine for itself whether
the licensee's contention is a "reasonable" one. To do so, the Commission must first frame the issue presented by the broadcast. Whether the
issue is framed as encompassing only that which is explicitly stated
73.

E.g., Address by Clay Whitehead, Director of Office of Telecommunications Policy. Dec.

18, 1972, discussed in Broadcasting, Jan. 1, 1973, at 18, col. 1. See Goldberg, A Proposal to
Deregulate Programming, 42 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 73. 73-74 (1973).
74. 13 F.C.C. at 1256. See Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1. 12-13 (1974).
75. 47 U.S.C. § 31(a) (1970); 47 C.F.R. § 73.24(K) (1974); see Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1970).

77. The Commissioner reported that in fiscal year 1971 the "commission received more than
2000 fairness complaints, which generated 168 commission inquiries-an inquiries-to-complaints
ratio of about 8%. And of the inquiries, . . . 69 resulted in staff or commission rulings, with no
more than five adverse to the licensee." Broadcasting, July 2. 1973. at 34, col. 3. See Comment.
The Fairness Doctrine and Broadcast License Renewals: Brandywine-Main Line Radio. Inc.,
71 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 458 (1971).

78. "If a licensee's determination is reasonable and arrived at in good faith ... we will not
disturb it." Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 13 (emphasis omitted).
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rather than encompassing also that which has been implicitly stated
may be determinative of the result that the Commission reaches. 79 The
Commission has recognized that its "mechanical approach"8 0 in determining whether a controversial issue has been raised led to the "great
mistake" 8 1 of applying the fairness doctrine to cigarette advertisements
in WCBS-TV, 82 and to advertisements for high-powered cars in
Friends of the Earth v. FCC.83 In the cigarette advertising case, the
licensee argued that the commercials in question raised only the issue
of whether cigarette smoking is a pleasurable activity-the explicit
message being that cigarette smoking is pleasurable. Thus it was
"reasonable" for the broadcasters to conclude that the advertisements
were not controversial. If, however, the statement "cigarette smoking
is pleasurable" implies that "cigarette smoking is desirable," then the
broadcasters were unreasonable in their conclusion, given the overwhelming scientific evidence that cigarette smoking poses a serious
threat to the public health.8 4 In other cases, however, the implicit
message of a statement may not be sufficiently obvious, and its impact
may depend more upon the subjective impression produced by the
message. And this subjective impression may depend significantly on
the political, philosophical or emotional biases of the observer.
In San Francisco Women for Peace,8 5 the complaint alleged that
certain radio and television stations had violated the fairness doctrine
by broadcasting armed forces recruitment messages as a public service,
while refusing to broadcast messages presenting opposing viewpoints.
To substantiate the allegation that the recruitment announcements
raised a controversial issue, the complainants asserted that "many
groups in the San Francisco area .. .do not believe it is beneficial to

the individual or society at large for people to Uoini the armed
79. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co., 25 F.C.C.2d 735, 736-38 (1970); Boalt Hall Student
Ass'n, 20 F.C.C.2d 612, 615-16 (1969) (FCC will not substitute its judgment for that of licensee,
when the latter has acted reasonably and in good faith); Californians Against the Tax Trap
Initiative, 19 F.C.C.2d 507 (1969); Madalyn Murray, 40 F.C.C. 647, 648-50 (1965); see Note,
The FCC Fairness Doctrine and Informed Social Choice, 8 Harv. J. Legis. 333, 342 (1971).
80. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 24 (1974).
81. Id. at 26.
82. 8 F.C.C.2d 381, stay and reconsideration denied, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd sub nom.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
83.

449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

84. 9 F.C.C.2d at 938-40. Ultimately, Congress banned cigarette advertisements from the
airwaves. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970); Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972)
(congressional prohibition against cigarette advertising not violative of broadcasters' first and fifth
amendment rights).
85.

24 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970).
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forces." 8 6 Furthermore, they contended that it was impossible to
divorce recruitment ads from the war in Vietnam, where most recruits
were likely to be sent. Consequently, they sought to inform young
men, through their advertisements, that a more desirable course of
action was open to them, namely deferment from military service as
provided for by Congress. The licensees denied that the military
recruitment ads raised a controversial issue.
The FCC majority held that the licensees had not been unreasonable,
likening the military recruitment ads to similar recruitment ads for
policemen, firemen, Peace Corps volunteers and others, noting that the
power of the government to raise an army had not been questioned.
Rather, the thrust of the complaint was an objection to the use made
of the armed forcesY'7 That issue-though admittedly controversial in
1970-had not been raised by the broadcast of the recruitment messages.
In his dissent, Commissioner Johnson disagreed with the majority's
perception of the issues raised by the recruitment messages. As he saw
the advertisements, they could no more be separated from the Vietnam
war than the cigarette commercials could be separated from the health
hazards associated with smoking. 88
Ultimately, whether the recruitment messages "directly or by necessary inference" addressed the propriety of the Vietnam war is for the
most part subjectively dependent upon the emotional and political
inclinations of the observer. To one outraged by the war, the armed
forces appeared to be the instrumentality through which an abhorrent
policy was perpetrated. Conversely, to one not so emotionally or
politically inclined, the portrayal of the armed forces as a positive
factor in society did not necessarily imply approval of military
activity in Asia.
However objectively the reviewing body tries to act, it must formulate a judgment on the impact of what has been broadcast. In
addition, it might be argued that the more public emotions become
polarized over an issue, the more the Commission's determination of
the implicit message of a statement will depend upon its subjective
response to the statement. Ultimately, the views of those whose
emotional and political outlook are furthest from those held by the
FCC are most likely to be excluded by the application of unreliable
standards. The subjective sensitivity of the FCC and of the broadcast
industry-particularly those television broadcasters who must appeal
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 157-58.
Id. at 161 (Johnson, Comrn'r, dissenting).
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to the mood of the majority-is most likely to fall within the
mainstream of public perception. 8 9 Therefore, it is to be expected that
ideas which stray furthest from this middle ground of subjective
perception will be least likely to gain access to the airwaves. Viewed in
this light, the Commission's reasonableness standard leaves too much
leeway in the hands of the licensee, 90 and may contribute to the
narrowing of public debate over the airwaves.
The Commission has admitted its error in the cigarette advertising
case, but for a different reason:
[Wie do not believe that the usual product commercial can realistically be said to
inform the public on any side of a controversial issue of public importance. It would be
a great mistake to consider standard advertisements . . . as though they made a
meaningful contribution to public debate. It is a mistake, furthermore, which tends
only to divert the attention of broadcasters from their public trustee responsibilities in
aiding the development of an informed public opinion. 9 1

C.

Fairness and the Suppression of Controversial Views

In Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. 92 the Commission refused to
grant a renewal of a licensee who had failed to comply with the
fairness doctrine. When a group headed by Dr. Carl Mclntire applied
for renewal of its licenses to two radio stations in Media, Pennsylvania, numerous civic and religious organizations sought denial of the
application. 9 3 The FCC reversed its Hearing Examiner, holding that
89.

The FCC had intended to limit fairness doctrine scrutiny of product commercials to

cigarettes alone. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 25 (1974); see WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 958

(1967) (Johnson, Comm'r, concurring), aff'd sub nom., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971),

extended a fairness requirement to the pollution issue raised by advertising for high-powered cars
and comparisons between high-test and regular gasoline. Further application of the doctrine to
"ordinary product commercials" was not permitted. Consumers Arise Now, 23 P & F Radio Reg.
2d 955 (1971); see Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d at 26. Cf. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of

the Broadcaster:. Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 777-78 (1972).
90. The FCC has denied application of the fairness doctrine for lack of a controversial issue
in Peter C. Herbst, 48 F.C.C.2d 614, reconsideration denied, 49 F.C.C.2d 411 (1974), aff'd sub
nom., Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975); David C. Green, 24
F.C.C.2d 171 (1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Alan F. Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d 175
(1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1971); Citizens Communications Center, 21 P & F Radio
Reg. 2d 1222 (1971); see Swartz, Fairness for Whom? Administration of the Fairness Doctrine,
14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 457, 460 (1973).
91. 48 F.C.C.2d at 26. The First Circuit has denied a claim that the Commission has
exceeded its authority in denying precedential value to its cigarette and automobile holdings.
Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975).
92. 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), aff'd, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
93. 24 F.C.C.2d at 18 n.1.
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Brandywine's violations of the fairness doctrine and personal attack
rules 94 required denial of the renewal application.9"
What is perhaps most ironic about Brandywine is that although
WXUR undoubtedly had propagated a religious and political philosophy offensive to most, it had offered vigorous debate on controversial
issues. Moreover, there was ample evidence that the station had
offered a variety of opinions on a great number of issues. 9 6 As the
Hearing Examiner noted, "it is almost inconceivable that any station
could have broadcast more variegated opinions upon so many issues
than WXUR." 97 The sheer number of viewpoints expressed over the
air made it futile to attempt to determine whether opposing viewpoints
had been presented in a balanced proportion:
There was an attempt, however inept, to allow wide-swinging utterance of all shades
of thought. This met the first mandate of the Fairness Doctrine calling for broadcast of
divergent viewpoints but it ran head-on into the second commandment of protecting
persons and groups against attacks. 98

The Commission rejected Brandywine's contention that call-in programs, where listeners expressed their views over the air, had fulfilled
WXUR's fairness obligations, on the grounds that opposing views
were forced to be given in an antagonistic setting. 9 9 It objected to
Brandywine's failure to establish any procedure for previewing,
monitoring or reviewing its broadcasts-a failure that prevented
Brandywine from having full knowledge of what was being broadcast
over its station-and objected to Brandywine's failure to make public
00 The
announcements inviting the presentation of contrasting views. 1
FCC refused to take into account McIntire's offers of time for appearances which were not accepted. The Commission rejected the argument that Brandywine's transgressions had been mitigated by its small
staff and lack of financial resources, and concluded that Brandywine
had been
indifferent to its affirmative obligation "to encourage and implement the broadcast of
all sides of controversial public issues" . . and indeed, it was hostile to such
94. 47 C.F.R. § 73.300 (1975).
95. 24 F.C.C.2d at 21. Although the FCC found Brandywine to have misrepresented its
program plans and to have failed to make a reasonable effort to ascertain and serve the need of its
listeners, "[a]t the heart of this proceeding [was] the question of compliance with the Fairness
Doctrine." Id.
96. Id. at 131.
97. Id.at 130.
98. Id. at 135.
99. Id. at 22-23. See Telephone Interview Programs. 22 P & F Radio Reg 2d 1S03 (1971);
Council for Better Transportation Planning, 32 F.C.C.2d 302 (1971).
100. 24 F.C.C.2d at 22.
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broadcasts. This serious Fairness Doctrine violation warrants a denial of Brandywine's
renewal applications. 101

Chief Judge Bazelon, dissenting from the court's affirmance, aptly
summarized the case against the Commission's decision in his dissent
from his court's affirmance of the FCC decision:
The Commission's strict rendering of fairness requirements, as developed in its
decision, has removed WXUR from the air. This has deprived the listening public not
only of a viewpoint but also of robust debate on innumerable controversial issues. It is
beyond dispute that the public has lost access to information and ideas. This is not a
loss to be taken lightly, however unpopular or disruptive we might judge these ideas to
be. 102

Indeed, if the raison d'9tre of the fairness doctrine is to increase public
exposure to the presentation of divergent ideas, the Commission's
sanction was a serious blow to the ideal which the fairness doctrine
was designed to serve.
The decision cannot be divorced entirely from the unpopular and
often offensive views which were presented over WXUR. 103 In light of
previous Commission practice in this area,' 04 it is appropriate to ask
whether the FCC would have given such emphasis to the ratio of
licensee views versus opposing views had the licensee's views been
more bland. In any event, the lesson of Brandywine is that the more
time a licensee devotes to public debate, and the more his views
deviate from the mainstream of public opinion, the less likely he will
be able to retain his license to broadcast.1' s This threat to the
marginal, off-beat broadcaster may serve to diminish public debate
over the air while offering only additional blandness in its place. 10 6
D. Fairness and the News
Although the Commission does not review the accuracy of news
reporting in its enforcement of the fairness doctrine, 10 7 fairness com101. Id. at 25.
102. 473 F.2d 16, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
103. See Mallamud, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Tolvard the Enforcement of
Discretion, 1973 Duke L.J. 89, 119.
104. See note 90 supra.
105. "The suggestion that constitutionally protected speech may be banned because some
persons may find the ideas expressed offensive is, in itself, offensive to the very meaning of the
First Amendment." CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 194-95 n.35 (1973)
(Brennan, J.. dissenting).
106. See Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 886
(1970) (significance of economic pressures that are exerted upon broadcasters to air only generally
accepted views).
107. Mrs. J. R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591 (1969).
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plaints are often accompanied by charges of news distortion, 0 8 and
the FCC has warned that permission to editorialize does not justify
distortion, slanting or suppression of the facts underlying the issues for
public debate.' 0 9 Accuracy of news reporting and fairness are conceptually related, in that debate on controversial issues obviously must
require exposure to the facts underlying the issues. Broadcasters have
insisted that some allegations of news media bias are motivated by the
belief that they can yield politically useful results. 1I"0 What may appear
to government as a one-sided presentation of issues may seem to
broadcast journalists but a reasonable presentation of facts.'
Commission policy in regard to allegations of distortion, slanting,
fabrication and staging of the news has been to refuse to take any
action unless the complainant submits "substantial extrinsic evidence
or documents that on their face reflect deliberate distortion."' 1 This
burden is so great that as a practical matter, the FCC rarely challenges
the discretion of the broadcaster with respect to these matters. A
second, more difficult problem was addressed in Accuracy in Media,
Inc."' 3 The complaint alleged that NBC had violated the fairness
doctrine in its presentation of Pensions: The Broken Promise. 1"1In the
eyes of Accuracy in Media (AIM), NBC engaged in "advocacy journalism," by "taking sides and rigging your story in order to influence
public opinion to support the side that you think to be right." I"- AIM's
position was equivalent to a charge that NBC hid behind the shield of
investigative journalism in order to editorialize, without having to
108. See, e.g., Bernard T. Callan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758 (1971); J. Allen Carr, 30 F.C.C.2d 894
(1971).
109. See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
110. See Lowry, Agnew and The TV News: A Before/After Content Analysis. 48 Journalism
Q. 205 (1971).
111. Broadcasting, Oct. 8, 1973, at 31, col. 1.
112. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 21 (1974); see, e.g., CBS Program "The Selling of the
Pentagon," 30 F.C.C.2d 150 (1971); Bernard T. Callan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758 (1971); Mrs. J. R. Paul,
26 F.C.C.2d 591 (1969); Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d
650 (1969).
113. 40 F.C.C.2d 958 (1973), vacated and remanded for dismissal of complaint on ground of
mootness sub nona., NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1976) (No. 75-670).
114. Aired in September of 1972, the Peabody Award-winning program showed workers who
told of losing pension income through a variety of misfortunes-pre-retirement dismissals.
company closings or mergers, the collapse of pension funds because of mismanagement. Correspondent Edwin Newman noted near the end of the hour-long broadcast that "there are many
good" pension plans. But his conclusion was downbeat: "The situation, as we've seen it, is
deplorable." 516 F.2d at 1107. The text of the entire program is set out in an appendix to the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals opinion. 516 F.2d at 1134-46.
115. Accuracy in Media, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 1027, 1032 (1973).
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comply with its trustee duty to afford an opportunity to the "other
side" to be heard.
From NBC's standpoint, application of the fairness doctrine to
investigative reports would have meant the emasculation of effective
broadcast journalism. According to the network, the program was
designed to expose the public to certain facts about the performance of
some private pension plans, without addressing the issue of what
percent of pension programs fail to perform as expected, and without6
offering any answers to the problems exposed by the documentary."
Under these circumstances, application of the fairness doctrine would
amount to an intrtision into the broadcast journalist's most essential
liberty, that of gathering and disseminating news free of governmental
interference. 117
NBC argued that governmental invasions of the broadcaster's
primarily journalistic function is particularly dangerous since the government is so often the subject being investigated, and is an act
inconsistent with the historical dissociation of government and
press.118 The FCC rejected NBC's claim that application of the
broadcaster's' public trustee duties to investigative reporting would in
the long run render broadcast journalism meaningless:
NBC has a journalist's role; it has an additional role as a public trustee of providing a
forum for diverse views on public issues. The two roles are not incompatible. 19

Obviously, the fairness problems posed by investigative reporting do
not lend themselves to any easy solutions. Even if it were always
possible to sort out the facts from the underlying issues, the possibility
remains that a straightforward presentation of selective facts could
have the same effect as a one-sided expression of opinion. Thus, a
broadcaster might conceal editorial advocacy under the guise of a
purely factual report. On the other hand, if every piece of investigative
reporting must be balanced, "television news must never examine a
problem in American life without first ascertaining120that [the network]
had piled up enough points on the other side.'
In the last analysis, collection and dissemination of the news, the
116. Id.at 1028-29; see 516 F.2d at 1117.
117. In the past, the Commission had rejected similar charges against other news programs.
See, e.g., CBS Program "The Selling of the Pentagon," 30 F.C.C.2d 150 (1971); CBS Program
"Hunger in America," 20 F.C.C.2d 143 (1969).
118. Thomas Jefferson stated that "[ilf left to me to decide whether we should have a
government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate for
a moment to prefer the latter." C. Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton-The Struggle for Democracy
in America 108 (1925).
119.

44 F.C.C.2d at 1043.

120.

Reuven Frank, quoted in Time, Feb. 4, 1974, at 59, col. 2.
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most purely journalistic functions of the broadcast licensee, may not
readily lend themselves to the requirements of the fairness doctrine,
despite the networks' virtual monopoly in determining which newsworthy facts will be seen on the nightly news. Of course one cannot
minimize the enormous power of those who select which of the day's
events will be brought to the attention of the viewing public, and what
form these events will take to fit within the format of a half-hour
presentation. To allow the government to enter the newsroom would
not provide a solution to any of the foregoing problems, but, quite to
the contrary, would compound them by adding a more pernicious form
of censorship-government censorship-to the already existing forms
of private censorship. Consequently, there is a strong case for the
proposition that the journalistic activities of broadcasters-like those
of the printed press-should be explicitly declared beyond government
reach.' 2' The District of Columbia Court of Appeals' reversal of the
FCC, later vacated for mootness, offers at least a step in the right
direction: the FCC's authority in administering the fairness requirements of broadcast journalism is to be limited to "correcting the
licensee for abuse of discretion."' 1 2 The great danger posed by affirmative government intervention into this area is that, while such action
may be formulated in terms of criticism of the broadcaster's conduct as
a trustee and purport to be made in the name of the public interest, it
may nevertheless be little more than an assault on the broadcaster's
conduct as journalist when such conduct is perceived as detrimental to
the interests of those in power.
E.

Entertainment and Fairness: Should
Fiction Be Balanced?
Although most entertainment' 2 3 programming offered on television
can be characterized as a deliberate effort to avoid touching upon
controversial issues of public importance, recent fictional heroes such as
Archie Bunker and Maude have espoused highly controversial positions on various issues of current public interest.' 2 4 Fairness com121.

See Network Coverage of the Democratic Nat'l Convention, 16 F C C 2d 650, 654-56

(1969); Note, The First Amendment and Regulation of Television News. 72 Colum, L. Rev 746.
767-71 (1972). The Supreme Court held the first amendment applicable to mass communications
media in United States v. Paramount Pictures. Inc.. 334 U5S. 131, 166 (1948).
122.

NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1974). vacated. S16 F 2d 1180 (D.C.

Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
123. For purposes of this section, "entertainment" will be understood to denote presentations
of fictional characters and situations, other than those used to convey the message of an
advertiser.
124. E.g., Diocesan Union of Holy Name Soc'ies. 41 FC.C.2d 297 (19731 (demand to reply to
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plaints have demanded that time be provided for spokesmen opposing
the positions taken by the fictional characters. 125 Although these
complaints have neither been numerous nor successful, 126 they are
likely to continue so long as the networks find that controversial
fictional programming attracts a sizable portion of the viewing public.
To date, the FCC has neither addressed the substantial issues raised
by these complaints nor specifically stated that the fairness doctrine
applies to the points of view expressed by the fictional characters
appearing in fictional productions. 2 7 Nevertheless, since application
of the fairness doctrine to entertainment programming might place the
Commission in a position of drama critic, 128 this area should be
considered.
Entertainment programming can raise one side of a controversial
issue either explicitly or implicitly. 12 9 Examples of the former are
provided by All in the Family and .Maude, where the characters
express controversial views on a variety of subjects. An example of the
latter is the series Bridget Loves Bernie, which in having depicted the
happy marriage of a Catholic to30a Jew could be viewed as implicitly
approving interfaith marriage.1
The Bridget Loves Bernie controversy, which was central to cancellation of the program, took place without the aid of the fairness
doctrine or the intervention of the FCC. 13 1 Had balance been sought
instead of suppression, and had it been sought under the fairness
doctrine, the FCC would have had to decide how to apply the doctrine
to issues raised by implication in a fictional series which avoids explicit
controversy.' 3 2 Application of the doctrine would call for FCC deterpro-abortion position taken on "Maude"); Robert S. Gelman, 29 F.C.C.2d 34 (1971) (demand to
respond to Archie Bunker's alleged personal attack against lawyers of the Jewish faith).
125. See note 134 infra and accompanying text.
126. E.g., Diocesan Union of Holy Name Soc'ies, 41 F.C.C.2d 297 (1973). Only one such
complaint was made during a six-month period in 1973. See H. Geller, The Fairness Doctrine in
Broadcasting: Problems and Suggested Courses of Action 114-32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Geller].
127. See Note, The Fairness Doctrine and Entertainment Programming: All in the Family, 7
Ga. L. Rev. 554, 559 n.34 (1973).
128. See New England Coastal Schaghticoke Indian Ass'n, 35 F.C.C.2d 868 (1972) (FCC will
not censor allegedly false depiction of American Indian by "Daniel Boone" program).
129.

See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text.

130.

At least, this is the view expressed by several Jewish organizations that urged CBS to

drop the series. Broadcasting, Feb. 12,

1973 at 62, col. 1.

131. Jewish groups who found the series' implied message objectionable negotiated directly
with the network, threatening a boycott of products advertised on the show. At first, CBS stated
that "intermarriage was the peg for the series and to drop it would be to lose the point of the
series," and that to cancel the show would "do a disservice to the millions who obviously like It."
Id. at col. 2.
132. If the portrayal of a happy interfaith couple constituted advocacy of the proposition that
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mination of what types of programming could reasonably provide
balance to the implied message of the series.
133
Can a licensee demonstrate balance in its overall presentation
other than by fictional presentations on behalf of the other side of the
issue? If each episode of Bridget Loves Bernie impliedly endorsed
intermarriage, then a single program opposing intermarriage might not
suffice. On the other hand, a presentation by anti-intermarriage forces
every three or four weeks would seem unwarranted in light of the fact
that the series refrained from expressly articulating a pro-intermarriage
position.

34
1

Explicitly uttered controversial statements prompted a fairness complaint against CBS for airing a two-part episode of Maude wherein
Maude learns that she has become pregnant and decides to have an
abortion. The complainants alleged that the programs in question
"espoused a pro-death position by promoting abortion."' 13s The complainants requested "that 'fairness' and 'personal attack' time be afforded for the presentation of a 'pro-life' program 'within the
framework of the Maude show,' " or that time be made available by
CBS for the presentation of "pro-life" views during the time slot
normally reserved for the airing of Maude. 136 The network contended
that " '[i]n light of the obviously fictional and satirical context of the
intermarriage is desirable, then any bland entertainment program might trigger a fairness
obligation if the issue raised were of sufficient public controversy. See Polish Am. Congress v.
FCC, 520 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 44 U.S.L.W. 3472 (U.S. Feb.
23, 1976) (No. 75-593) (FCC denial of fairness complaint over broadcast of Polish joke material
affirmed: neither the proposition that Poles or Polish Americans are "inferior to other human
beings," nor that "broadcasting Polish jokes is desirable" constitutes a controversial issue of
public importance). A program portraying the friendship of a black person and a white person
might imply that there is harmony between the races, and a vapid domestic situation comedy
might implicitly endorse the inequality of the sexes. But see Anthony R. Martin-Trigona, 22
F.C.C.2d 683 (1970) ("mere passing reference to an issue" not deemed such advocacy that fairness
obligation triggered); cf. National Organization for Women, 48 F.C.C.2d 497 (1974) (licensee
determination that fairness doctrine inapplicable to commercial promoting "Bridal Fair" held not
unreasonable).
133. The FCC ordinarily applies an "overall programming" standard to a station's fairness
obligation. E.g., Black Efforts for Soul in Television, 24 F.C.C.2d 429 (1970) (both sides of
controversy met in the course of licensee's overall programming).
134. The "best" solution would seem to lie in the presentation of a fictional series depicting an
unhappy interfaith marriage, thereby impliedly expressing disapproval of intermarriage. This
solution would have the merit of countering the emotional appeal generated by the association of
interfaith marriage and happiness with the emotional distaste caused by the association of
intermarriage and unhappiness. Such a solution serves to underscore the practical difficulties
encountered in providing balance to the implied messages of entertainment programming.
135. Diocesan Union of Holy Name Soc'ies, 41 F.C.C.2d 297 (1973). In support of their
contention, the complainants cited the following lines of dialogue: "Carol: . . . We're free. We
finally have the right to decide what we can do with our own bodies.... And it's as simple as
going to the dentist .... There's no reason to feel guilty and there's no reason to be afraid." Id.
136. Id. at 298.
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series,' the programs in question were 'solely intended for entertainment and not for the discussion of viewpoints on controversial issues of
public importance.' ",137
Although the FCC did not reach the merits of these contentions, the
weakness of the CBS argument is apparent. Fiction and satire not only
can be appropriate vehicles for the transmission of controversial messages, but often provide a most effective outlet for such messages. A
forceful satire may be worth more than ten explanatory speeches, and
an audience does not automatically lose its receptiveness to controversial viewpoints because it is being entertained.
A better argument for CBS might have been to admit that the
fictional characters took a stand on a controversial issue of public
importance, but to insist that, in light of the fictional and satirical
nature of the program, it would be inappropriate for the FCC to
decide which side of a controversial issue was promoted by the
program. Even if it were conceded that an administrative agency could
appropriately pass judgment on the impact of a fictional presentation,
successful controversial fictional characters are often different things to
different people, since an utterance by a character perceived as being
ridiculous might have the effect of promoting the opposite of what the
character has endorsed. 138 Given the subtlety of fictional presentation,
CBS might argue that it is preferable to exempt entertainment programming altogether from the requirements of the fairness doctrine
than to allow the government to impose an official interpretation on
comedy and satire.
F. Fairness Versus Access: CBS v. DNC
Four years after its failure to have the fairness doctrine declared
unconstitutional in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 139 the broadcasting industry was successful in using the doctrine to bar an attempt
to establish a constitutional right of access to the electronic media in
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) v. Democratic National
Committee (DNC). 140 In determining whether a licensee's flat ban on
editorial advertising came under his role as public trustee, or whether
it fell within the discretion afforded a journalist, the broad premise of
Red Lion that "[iJt is the right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experi137.

Id.

138. Surveys are said to show "that a substantial portion of the regular audience identifies
with-not against-Archie Bunker." W. Key, Subliminal Seduction 159 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
139. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See notes 40-43 supra and accompanying text.
140.

412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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ences ... ."141 could provide only a starting point. CBS v. DNC

raised the possibility that the fairness doctrine might be supplemented
by at least a limited right of access to the airwaves.
Two cases were consolidated in CBS v. DNC. In Business Executives' .V1ove for Vietnam Peace (BEM) v. FCC, 142 a national organization opposed to United States involvement in Vietnam complained to
the FCC that radio station WTOP had refused to sell it time to
broadcast a series of spot announcements expressing BEM views on
Vietnam. WTOP's policy was to refuse to accept editorial advertising.' 43 In Democratic National Committee, the Democratic Party
sought a declaratory ruling that "[a] broadcaster may not, as a general
policy, refuse to sell time to responsible entities

. . .

for the solicitation

of funds and for comment on public issues."' 144 Stressing that Congress
had refused to treat broadcasters as common carriers, the Supreme
Court majority 45 reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia that the first amendment and the Communications Act made WTOP's policy illegal:
Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations. Only when the interests of the public
are found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the 4broadcasters
will
6
government power be asserted within the framework of the Act.'

The majority found that the private journalistic interests of the
broadcasters had not been outweighed by the interests of the public, in
that the public's right to be informed was satisfied by the operation of
the fairness doctrine, and that the licensee's refusal to carry editorial
advertising constituted a proper exercise of licensee editorial responsibility. The complainants had challenged the broadcaster in his journalistic role, in which context he was justified in deciding that brief
spot announcements were an ill-suited format for the intelligent treatment of issues of public importance. The Court took the position that
the dispute centered on the question of which voice should carry a
given message to the public. Since the message was being carried
anyway, the licensee could retain control over the selection of the
format and the speaker, lest the government become more deeply
141. 395 U.S. at 390.
142. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom., CBS. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
143. 450 F.2d at 647.
144. Id.
145. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority in parts I, II, and IV of his opinion In part
III, he was joined only by Justices Rehnquist and Stewart. Four justices wrote concurring
opinions.
146. 412 U.S. at 110.
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involved in the daily operation of broadcasters without any significant
extra benefit to the public.
To Justice Brennan, the majority's emphasis on the broadcaster's
journalistic role was misplaced, since the controversy concerned only
the
allocation of advertising time-air time that broadcasters regularly relinquish to others
without the retention of significant editorial control. Thus, we are concerned here, not
with the speech of broadcasters themselves, but, rather, with their "right" to decide
which other individuals will be given47 an opportunity to speak in a forum that has
already been opened to the public.

Viewed this way, the weak journalistic interest of the broadcaster
was offset by the strong need for the public to be exposed to as many
different views as possible, an interest which, according to Justice
Brennan, the fairness doctrine has not fully satisfied. 148 Thus, the
broadcaster's right to impose a flat ban against all editorial advertising
was outweighed by the need of some form of limited access, which,
with the fairness doctrine, could better present issues of public importance to the citizenry whose need to be informed is paramount.
Although both the majority and the dissent viewed the case within
the framework of the broadcaster's dual role as public trustee and
journalist, they reached divergent conclusions because of their differing assessments of the distinction between political and commercial
advertising. The majority's view can be roughly summarized as stating
the following: since the broadcast audience is a "captive" one which
must already endure an avalanche of commercial advertising, it is in
the public interest to allow the licensee, in his editorial capacity, to
draw the line at some point.' 4 9 The dissent, on the other hand,
maintained that once a broadcaster relinquishes control over advertising by making his facilities available for the commercial advertisers
who pay him for access, he cannot refuse to sell time to advertisers
with political messages solely because of the content of their messages. 150 For this reason the different treatment given "commercial"
speech and "controversial" speech for purposes of access was constitutionally impermissible. The dissent accepted the view of the intermediate court that such different treatment is "favoritism toward the
status quo and public apathy and, in these cases, a favoritism toward
bland commercialism."' 5 1 The Court of Appeals had viewed the term
"controversial" as significantly ambiguous:
147.

Id. at 199-200 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).

148.
149.

Id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 127-28.

150. Id. at 200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151.

450 F.2d at 661.
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Some advertisements may not be deemed "'controversial" . .. but may still express
ideas, the negative of which would surely be labeled "controversial." Ads for Radio
Free Europe or Army recruiting, for example, may be allowed unanswered on the air.
while ads calling the notion of the "free world" a sham or ads calling the Army a threat
to democracy would be banned entirely. The line between ideological and nonideological presentations is an almost impossible one to draw. All too often in our
society one particular ideology-that of passivity, acceptance of things as they are, and
exaltation of commercial values-is simply taken for granted, assumed to be a
nonideology, and allowed to choke out all the rest. - 2

A second issue on which the majority and the dissent differed was
the efficacy of the fairness doctrine. To the dissent, the licensee's
freedom under the fairness doctrine to separate the advocate from his
views diminished the effectiveness of the concept that the "expression
of his views is as dependent on the style and format of presentation as
it is on the content itself."' 5 3 Also, to the dissent, the fairness doctrine
requirement that " 'representative community views and voices on
controversial issues' " be presented served
to perpetuate coverage of those "views and voices" that are already established, while

failing to provide for exposure of the public to those "views and voices" that are novel,
unorthodox, or unrepresentative of prevailing opinion.' 4

In this view, fairness cannot by itself transcend the blandness which is
sought by the broadcaster, who fears to alienate any significant segment of the audience lest he thereby fail to maximize profits. So long as
the broadcaster remains entirely in control of the issues and voices
heard over his station, there is little chance that the public will become
exposed to the " 'widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources.' ",'-.5 Professor Jaffe has pointed out
the "considerable possibility the broadcaster will exercise a large
amount of self-censorship and try to avoid as much controversy as he
56

safely can."'
If the fairness doctrine is by itself insufficient to assure that an
adequate flow of information will reach the public, and a limited right
of access will promote expansion of public debate over the airwaves,
then it might seem appropriate to grant access programming in areas
where the broadcaster substantially has voluntarily relinquished his
152.

Id. (footnote omitted).

153.

412 U.S. at 190 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).

154. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 192 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964).
156. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster. Reflections on Fairness and
Access, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 768, 773 n.26 (1972). ABC was on record that it would refuse to air
those views which it considers "scandalous" or "crackpot," and CBS stated it excluded opinions
that are "insignificant" or "trivial." NBC would not permit speech that -strays 'beyond the
bounds of normally accepted taste.' " 412 U.S. at 191 (Brennan J.. dissenting).
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journalistic control. Regulation of private licensees and the fairness
doctrine both were conceived to establish a middle
ground between
'
complete government control and free access. However, a licensee's refusal of paid access, constitutionally protected by CBS, Inc. v. DNC, may not serve the public interest, if it
results in a grant to the broadcaster of more freedom than he needs to
assure the effective use of the airwaves. Where the broadcaster has
failed to exercise substantial editorial control over what is being
advertised on his station, it might be desirable for him to be bound by
this programming decision at least to the extent of not being allowed to
carve out an exception for advertising that does not suit his views. Just
as the broadcaster who grants access to editorial advertising that raises
one side of a controversial issue of public importance" 8 is required to
show reasonable presentation of opposing views, 5 9 he should not be
able to exclude a member of this class solely on grounds that he
disapproves of the content of that member's message.
This logic applies not only in the area of advertising, but also in
other areas which traditionally come under greater editorial control by
the broadcaster. Thus, in Student Association of the State University, 160 it was alleged that ABC had engaged in improper broadcast
censorship of political expression by failing to telecast a football
half-time show which expressed opposition to the Vietnam war, racism
and industrial pollution. The network had a policy of declining to
broadcast material that it deemed a "political demonstration."'' 6' The
Student Association contended that since ABC had previously broadcast "patriotic" half-time shows supportive of the war in Vietnam,
including a presentation where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff praised four war heroes and asked 4,300 cadets and midshipmen
to join in prayer for the armed forces, the network had no right to
deny access. ABC's sports producer allegedly had expressed ABC's
concern that potential customers of its commercial sponsors might be
alienated. 162
157. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
158. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
159. E.g., Wilderness Society, 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971), in which Esso commercials concerning Alaskan oil were held to raise implicitly the question of the need for rapid development of an
Alaskan pipeline, clearly a controversial issue of public importance. The Commission found that
the network had failed to present opposing views to the commercials. See Wilderness Society, 31
F.C.C.2d 729, 733 (1971). But see note 91 supra and accompanying text.
160. 40 F.C.C.2d 510 (1973).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 510-11. None would dispute that "advertising is the lifeblood of broadcasting." R.

Summers & H. Summers, Broadcasting and the Public 100 (1966). The extent to which
advertisers themselves control the media directly is a subject of dispute. See Simmons, Commer-
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ABC argued that given its concededly fair news coverage of the war,
all it had done was to determine that the half-time show was not an
appropriate format to carry the anti-war message. ABC defended its
decision as a reasonable one, stating that even though the material
presented in the half-time show was "perfectly appropriate for other
ABC programming, [it] was inappropriate for inclusion in the telecast
of a sporting event. ' 163 ABC sought to characterize the war hero
half-time show as mere military pagentry that at most made an
implicit reference to a public issue during a statement that was
ancillary to the program. The Commission upheld ABC's position,
stressing that because the point of view expressed by the Student
Association had been given ample coverage on other ABC programming, the Student Association's claim for a personal right of access
could be denied. 164 Although the content of what the Student Association decided to express in its half-time show might have been given
extensive coverage in other formats, what was important in the
students' statement was the expression of the message in the context of
a football game, rather than the content of the message itself. It was,
by ABC's admission, the association of football with an anti-war
position that caused the network to be fearful of alienating its sponsors'
customers. In other words, there may be a strong resistance against
associating football, often projected as "manly," "brave," "violent" and
"patriotic," with the anti-war position which is projected as being
"unmanly," "unbrave," and "unpatriotic." Yet, this very type of
resistance may be the source from which "robust, wide open debate"
springs, as the dissonant marriage of football and anti-war symbolism
was more likely to shake many out of their apathy than any series of
well-reasoned speeches. This, as the Commission's holding for the
network illustrates, cannot be achieved by the fairness doctrine alone.
It must be emphasized that the decision in Student Association is
unfortunate not because it sanctioned ABC's censorship of the students' half-time presentation, but rather because it deprived the viewing audience of exposure to vigorous expression from an antagonistic
source. Although a student association can have no general right to be
granted access to disseminate its views, a viewing audience was here
shielded from the anti-war view's most strident manifestation. If the
network shows non-controversial half-time shows while refusing to
carry those it deems to be potentially offensive, a distorted image is
cial Advertising and the Fairness Doctrine: The New F.C.C. Policy in Perspective. 75 Colum L
Rev. 1083, 1085-86 & n.30 (1975).
163. 40 F.C.C.2d at 512.
164. Id. at 516-17.
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conveyed, and a disservice is done to the viewing audience for which
the fairness doctrine affords no remedy.
Ultimately, whenever a licensee chooses to broadcast a football
game, a live theatrical performance, or a community group meeting, it
has voluntarily relinquished part of its control over the content of its
presentation, and should not be allowed to take back what it has
yielded solely because it objects to what is being expressed on a
particular occasion. If this practice were established, the licensee
would continue to be free to decide which football game or which play
to show on any given week, and this decision would not be subject to
any challenge, even if it could be clearly shown that it was taken for
the soie purpose of denying access to unpopular ideas.
What of the question of public access in areas of programming
where the licensee has not voluntarily relinquished any of its control?
Here again, the primary concern of the Communications Act is to
serve the public interest, not to provide a public forum for any given
individual to present personal views. Although too much access would
undermine effective use of the airwaves by promoting the very chaos
which the Act was designed to avoid, no access at all can deprive the
public of exposure to "those 'views and voices' that are novel, unorthodox, or unrepresentative of prevailing opinion."' 165 The fairness
doctrine itself is not triggered before a viewpoint on a given issue has
been expressed, so that it cannot insure presentation of all opposing
viewpoints. Therefore, some form of limited access might appear to be
in furtherance of the public interest.
The enactment of a plan of limited access, however, would present
thorny practical problems. It is doubtful that broadcasters would
voluntarily grant access to proponents of unorthodox or novel viewpoints, since to do so would not contribute to broadcaster profits, and
might alienate significant segments of the viewing audience. Moreover,
since not every viewpoint could be given broadcast time, a process of
selection would still have to be devised. Finally, if access were granted
to unorthodox groups, it is entirely possible that interest among the
public audience would be so low that the entire project might become
a costly waste of time.
IV.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPRAISAL OF FAIRNESS

A.

An Appraisal of the Present
Scheme of Regulation
At the very least, we have seen that the establishment and maintenance of a positive freedom of expression-the freedom for all ideas of
165.

412 U.S. at 190 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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public importance to be expressed over the airwaves-entails difficult
problems, unknown and unforeseen by proponents of a marketplace of
ideas grounded solely upon a negative freedom of expression. Indeed, a
regulated balance of interests cannot be achieved with the smoothness
and economy of means exhibited by the model of a self-regulating
marketplace, where the public or common interest is presumed to be
served by an unobstructed clash of divergent private interests.
In the self-regulating marketplace model each individual is free to
express his views in pursuit of his own interests, because truth-those
views useful in promoting the progress which leads to the greatest
happiness for the greatest number-is thought to emerge from the
uninhibited debate among all points of view. Thus, under the selfregulating model, the expression of an individual view serves both the
private interests of the speaker and the public interest, regardless of
whether society's adoption of the view expressed would itself be in the
public interest. Even if the adoption of a given individual view would
harm the public interest, the public debate of the view in question
would nevertheless benefit the public interest, for example, by sharpening the import of an opposed view. The individual interest services
the public interest even if the two interests do not coincide, and
whether or not the individual interest sought to be advanced is
ultimately frustrated. Therefore, if the public interest is best served by
each individual's pursuit of his private interests, the marketplace of
ideas that provides negative freedom of expression is a most efficient
mechanism.
By contrast, although the regulatory model of the broadcast spectrum is predicated on the same belief that truth will emerge from
robust and uninhibited debate on issues of public importance, it cannot
function without curtailing at least to some degree the opportunity of
all who wish to participate. If members of the public cannot be given
unrestricted access to the airwaves, broadcasters cannot be allowed to
operate without any constraints, lest their views monopolize the air.
Government cannot select the views to be presented over the air, even
in a disinterested and impartial way, without violating the first
amendment. Under these circumstances, the regulatory scheme which
underlies positive freedom in broadcasting must encounter substantial
difficulties, since it often operates in opposition to the individual's
inclination to promote his own private interests. Moreover, not only
does the regulatory scheme curtail the broadcaster's freedom to pursue
his own interests, but it also charges him with the responsibility of
determining the interest of the public and to act in accordance with it.
This responsibility, in turn, often presents the broadcaster with a
conflict of interest, aggravated by the imprecise boundary between his
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role as a journalist and his role as a trustee. Whenever the government
is motivated to conceal embarrassing information, it will face a conflict
with its duty to protect the public's right to know through proper
regulation. Broadcasters have asserted that the fairness doctrine is a
means used by the government to pursue a course of supervision by the
"raised eyebrow,"'166 thwarting the broadcast journalist's inclination to
engage in the vigorous and often controversial reporting of his newspaper counterpart. Finally, at least in the opinion of Newton Minow,
former chairman of the FCC, the public interest in broadcasting is not
what interests the public-not what the public wants-but presumably
what will enlighten the public and enable it to choose among competing alternatives. 167
Despite the conceptual difficulty of defining the boundaries of the
conflicting interests to be served, and the practical difficulties of
finding an efficient scheme of regulation, the regulatory scheme that
arises from implementation of a "positive freedom" can be defended if
the benefits it brings to the marketplace of ideas outweigh the restraints it imposes on those it affects. Indeed, all positive freedoms must
require some sacrifice of freedom, which is justified if the sacrifices are
clearly outweighed by the newly gained freedom. Hence, if the fairness
doctrine preserves free flow of ideas over the airwaves, the interests
adversely affected by its application will not tip the balance in favor of
its repeal. 168 This is particularly true since even under the alternative
laissez-faire model, no effort is to be made to promote the realization of
individual interests once the ideas offered in their support have been
freely introduced into the marketplace of ideas.
The analysis of the fairness doctrine seems to imply that the regulatory scheme has failed in its attempt to establish a free marketplace of
ideas over the airwaves. This failure is perhaps most sharply brought
into focus in Brandywine and San Francisco Women For Peace. These
cases demonstrate that the requirement of "balance" actually promotes
conformity and non-controversy, and that any application of a "reasonableness" standard to determine whether a given issue is controversial almost inevitably will make it impossible for administrators to
avoid an inquiry into the content of broadcast material.
Since the requirement of balance does not come into play until one
166. See Mickelson, "'The First Amendment and Broadcast Journalism," in The First
Amendment and The News Media, Final Report of the Annual Chief justice Earl Warren
Conference on Advocacy in the United States, June 8-9, 1973, at 54.
at 137.
167. N. Minow, Speech Before the National Association of
Gewirth, Political Justice, in Social Justice 164 n.50 (R. Brandt
168. See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression

Cf. Robinson, supra note 42,
Broadcasters, quoted in A.
ed. 1962).
663 (1970).
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side of a controversial issue has been presented, 69 broadcasters can to
a large extent avoid the trouble of seeking out spokesmen for controversial viewpoints, and thus minimize the risk of alienating any
significant segment of their audience, by refraining from presenting any
side of a controversial issue. As long as the broadcaster endeavors to
present a certain minimum of controversial subject matter, lest he risk
losing his license at renewal time, he remains free to pursue his
economic goal of maximizing profits by appealing to the widest possible audience through bland and inoffensive programming.' 7 0 On the
other hand, a broadcaster who decides to flood his frequency with
controversial programming assumes a heavy burden to meet the balance requirement, and may lose substantial advertising revenue as
well. Moreover, if a broadcaster's own views are unpopular and
offensive to the majority, he may find it particularly difficult to achieve
balance. 17 1 In sum, the requirement of balance blends well with the
broadcaster's economic interest in promoting blandness and conformity
over the air. Thus, the regulative scheme fails to provide adequate
protection for unpopular ideas, while enabling non-controversial and
generally accepted views to flow unhindered. Accepted views go
unchallenged, while disputed ones can be stated only if adequate
provision is made for their subsequent negation. Needless to say, this
is hardly what Mill envisaged for a free marketplace of ideas.'"7
Our examination of the definition of "controversy" revealed that
administrative decisions in the area could not be entirely divorced from
a subjective assessment of the issue under consideration. Where the
Commission finds that the licensee was unreasonable in asserting that
a given statement was not controversial, it must be shown that a
balancing view was presented. If the Commission holds that the
licensee's determination was "reasonable," no counter-statement need
enter into the marketplace of ideas. Whichever result the Commission
reaches, it exerts control over the flow of ideas, thereby affecting the
nature and scope of the marketplace of ideas. The regulatory scheme
meant to provide positive freedom of expression restrains not only
freedoms other than expression, but operates to restrict freedom of
expression itself. The regulative scheme gives government a role in the
selection of those viewpoints which are granted access to the marketplace of ideas, though it does not operate to the systematic exclusion
of any particular view. However, if Mill is right, and government
169. Geller, supra note 126, at 66.
170. This is especially true in the context of television, where a few network-dominated
channels compete for the attention of the general public.
171. See notes 97-101 supra and accompanying text.
172.

See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
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represents the public opinion of the mass which supports it, then the
government's affirmative input is much more likely to err on the side of
conformity than on the side of increased debate.
Mill's belief that independent thought is desirable 173 was predicated
on the assumption that novel and unorthodox ideas often have the
force necessary to awaken slumbering individuals from the tyranny of
custom, forcing them to use their mental faculties. Eccentricity itself is
as much a matter of form as a matter of substance, since an old idea
1 74
may find new vigor when presented in an unorthodox context.
Thus, although a free marketplace of ideas could undoubtedly be
enriched by the introduction of novel and unorthodox expression of old
ideas as well as by expression of new ideas, the operation of the
fairness doctrine does little to encourage either. The regulatory scheme
makes broadcast of novel and unorthodox views of any sort quite
unlikely.
The exclusion of eccentricity of form was best illustrated by Student
Association, where the fairness doctrine requirements of balance failed
to temper the broadcaster's self-interest in keeping potentially offensive
and shocking material off the air. In general, the broadcaster can
satisfy his obligation to provide balance after one side of a controversial issue has been stated by airing the views of some representative
spokesman for the "other side," thereby reducing complex and multifaceted issues into "two sides." The broadcaster, in selecting the format
and the speaker for the "other side," can avoid the most forceful
expression of an unpopular view when he disagrees with it, or when he
fears that giving it airtime may run counter to his pecuniary interests.
Since dissonant notes are more likely to offend the collective ears of the
audience, the broadcaster has a strong incentive to keep the debate
low-keyed and dull.
The exclusion of novel and unorthodox ideas is the result of several
factors, among which can be counted the requirement of balance, and
the fact that the fairness doctrine comes into operation only after "one
side" of a controversial issue has been put over the air. However, we
should not overlook the fact that the fairness doctrine is limited in
application to controversial issues of public importance. At first sight,
this requirement might seem appropriate, since it would seem illadvised to glut the scarce airwaves with controversial matter of mere
private importance. On closer analysis, however, this requirement contributes significantly to the exclusion of novel and unorthodox ideas be173.
174.

On Liberty, supra note 3, at 196.
See text accompanying notes 163-64 supra.
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cause under the fairness doctrine, a controversial issue that addresses
matters of a public nature is not deemed one of public importance if
it fails to seem important to the public. Thus, if a view overwhelmingly accepted by a great majority of the public is stated over the air,
and this view stands in opposition to the view held by an insignificant
minority, the view of the latter need not be given time over the air,
since the controversy is not one of public importance. Atheist 7 5 and
Communist 76 views have been kept off the air on this ground because
the Commission estimated that what their advocates had to say was
not important to the public, even though the public had heard attacks
on the positions held by those advocates. From this, it would seem to
follow that novel and unorthodox views of public importance which do
not appear important to the public must almost inevitably fall victim
to the tyranny of public opinion, and be suppressed.
Certainly, the marketplace of ideas over the airwaves bears little
resemblance to the original model it was supposed to emulate. The
fairness doctrine emerges less as a guarantor of full and uninhibited
debate than as an often unaware protector of public opinion, carving
an unobstructed path for the middle ground of mediocrity while
obstructing the path of the unconventional and the novel. The purported positive freedom it creates is at best but half a freedom,
imposing sacrifice upon the interests of many, yet failing to open the
medium to all views of public importance.
B. Evaluation of Possible Alternatives
Having concluded that the present scheme of regulation fails to
preserve a genuine free marketplace of ideas over the airwaves, it
becomes necessary to determine which possible alternative will best
serve to approximate the ends sought by Mill. Once it is assumed that
Mill's model cannot work in the electronic media, we can attempt to
determine whether a "positive" or "negative" model for freedom is best
suited to serve the public interest while straying least from the ultimate
objective of a full and vigorous debate of ideas.
Although current practice falls far short of the explicit purposes
which the administrative scheme was designed to serve, this fact does
not by itself mean that no "positive" scheme whatsoever can accomplish the task of preserving the free flow of ideas over the airwaves.
The failure of a practical scheme to secure a "positive" freedom need
175.
176.

Robinson, supra note 42, at 133.
Healey v. FCC, 460 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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not affect the ultimate possibility of attaining such a freedom through
better suited means.177

Unfortunately, no practical solutions can be envisaged in the case of
broadcasting. Indeed, even if one were to assume that the ends are
clearly defined (e.g., presentation over the air of all viewpoints on
issues of public importance), and that the means are readily available
(e.g., all individuals who hold views on matters of public importance
are within the broadcaster's reach, and are willing to cooperate), it
would still be impossible to devise an adequate scheme for the adoption of the means to the ends, or to find an objective criterion whereby
the success of the 'program could be satisfactorily measured. Indeed,
since the process of adapting the means to the end must necessarily
involve the selection of some views to the exclusion of others, someone
(or some group of individuals) will have to decide which view is, and
which is not, deserving of access into the medium. And no matter who
this someone turns out to be, he will not be able to discharge his
responsibility without making a value judgment for which no objective
criteria are available. 1781Moreover, even if it is assumed that the
medium can accommodate all viewpoints and that the process of adaptation of the means to the end is to be limited to the selection of one
among all spokesmen for the same viewpoint, there would still be a
need for subjective evaluation, and the role played by such infusion of
a subjective element into the administrative process could be important (e.g., the different impact which the statement, "The President
should be impeached," could have depending upon whether it were

177.

Thus, for example, if a current scheme devised to provide welfare assistance to the

needy is inefficient either because it is structured in such a way that funds are wasted, not readily
available for the intended beneficiaries of the program, or because it is corruptly or ineffectually
administered, it is plain that these problems could be solved (e.g., by restructuring the administrative process along lines more suitable for the eventual distribution of all available funds to
those for whom they were intended). Where the ends of the program are clearly defined (e.g., to
give a certain amount of monetary help to people falling within certain precisely circumscribed
categories), where the means are available (e.g., the money set aside for the program), where the
adoption of the means to the ends poses no theoretical problems (e.g., it is simply a matter of
putting the available funds into the hands of intended recipients), and where there exists a simple
objective criterion to determine whether the ends of the program are being reasonably fulfilled
(e.g., statistics showing how much of the available money is being distributed, and to whom it is
being given), problems of administration are reduced to practical considerations of efficiency
which eventually lend themselves to practical solutions.
178. In fact, if such objective criteria did exist, there would be no need for a free marketplace
of ideas, and the broadcasting medium could fulfill its obligation to the public by simply
presenting those views which had objectively been determined to be worthy of presentation for
the common good.
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uttered by a known communist or a nationally respected clergyman).
Ultimately then, no positive freedom can create a genuinely free
marketplace of ideas over the airwaves, since no administrative procedure can conceivably adapt the available means so as to generate a free
flow of ideas, without by the same token altering the end result which
it seeks to attain. In other words, no free flow of ideas can be obtained
by means of a procedure that is incapable of operating without altering
the flow of ideas. Even if the element of subjective evaluation were
removed, as where a lottery of ideas were held to determine entry into
the airwaves, this new flow of ideas would not be equivalent to that
which emerges from the exchange of views in the society at large.
That the lifting of all governmental regulations pertaining to broadcast content would restore a free flow of ideas over the airwaves is a
proposition that might be advanced by one who feels that the scarcity
of available broadcasting outlets-which gave rise to regulation in the
first place-is a thing of the past. Proponents of negative freedom for
broadcasters cannot claim that simply because there are now more
broadcast outlets than daily newspapers in the United States, vigorous
debate would increase significantly if the inhibitions brought about by
government intervention were removed. Without presently deciding
whether continued regulation or repeal of all regulation would better
serve the public interest, it should be pointed out that in spite of the
proliferation of broadcasting outlets, negative freedom cannot realistically be presently expected to fulfill the promise of a free flow of ideas
over the air. In the first place, the end to scarcity of channels promised
by the development of cable television is still in the future, 79 and
hence is not a significant factor for present consideration. Moreover,
the comparison of television outlets with daily newspapers does not,
under more careful scrutiny, lead to the conclusion which a proponent
of negative freedom might wish to draw. Quite to the contrary, the
concentration of ownership of the broadcasting industry' 80 shows that
negative freedom is no more capable than positive freedom of bringing
about the realization of a genuinely free marketplace of ideas over the
airwaves.
179.
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Having seen that Mill's model cannot succeed in the electronic
media, and keeping in mind the first amendment assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information is essential to the public's
welfare, one can decide which of the available alternative courses of
action would best serve the interests of the broadcasting public, while
ensuring as full and as vigorous a debate of ideas as possible. The
range of possible alternatives covers a spectrum ranging from the
abolition of all regulation to the reduction of the broadcaster to little
more than a common carrier. Some possibilities are to grant broadcasters the same freedom that is enjoyed by the printed press; to preserve
the present scheme of regulation; or to supplement or replace the
fairness doctrine with a right of public access to the airwaves which, if
substantial, could significantly reduce the broadcaster's control over
the operation of his station.
Even though concentration of ownership in the broadcasting industry promises less than full debate over the airwaves, the abolition of all
program regulation would perhaps be the best course to adopt if it
were proven more conducive to uninhibited debate than the present
regulatory scheme. To be sure, government regulation poses some risks
of censorship, and can at times inhibit broadcast journalism's capacity
to investigate controversial issues.
On the other hand, if broadcasters were left free to pursue their own
interests, they would most likely avoid controversy. There is little
doubt that for commercial broadcasters, broadcasting is above all a
means of making money. "Broadcasters are essentially people who sell
time to advertisers,"' 8' and therefore their principal concern must be
to line up the biggest possible audience to which the advertiser can
deliver his message. The broadcaster's true role may be to operate for
profit while maintaining the appearance of operating in the "public
interest," even though this conflicts with what can be considered the
public interest.
Replacing the fairness doctrine with a right of public access would
ensure the over-the-air appearance of voices whose self-interest would
not necessarily lie in the avoidance of controversy. This approach
could result in an increase in diversity, by permitting new voices, not
presently heard, to make their appearance over the airwaves.
Moreover, such a course of action would measurably decrease the
government's role in broadcasting by relegating its responsibility to
that of assuring that broadcasters make their facilities available when
181.
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appropriate. One major difficulty, however, is to determine how much
public access should be allowed in the best interests of the viewing
public. If only a token of public access is required, over-the-air debate
of controversial issues could become insignificant. If too much access
were imposed, other uses of the medium might be crowded out. Even
if it is assumed that a proper balance can be struck so that the
maximum public debate compatible with the effective use of the
airwaves can be achieved, the problem of finding a procedure guaranteeing a fair selection from among groups competing for access would
still be unresolved.
Notwithstanding the serious problems which each leaves unresolved, the choice between "fairness" and "access" can be narrowed, in
the last analysis, to the determination of whether the predominant
function of broadcasting should be to promote inter-group communication. If "access" is chosen over "fairness," it is likely that an increasing
number of views will find their way over the airwaves, and as new
outlets become available, new voices will be heard. But as this takes
place fewer listeners will be available for each new entry into the
marketplace of ideas. Eventually, with a modern society's tendency to
overspecialize, and the increasing trend of isolation of specialist
groups, members of a group will almost exclusively speak to other
members of the same group, severely limiting if not practically
eliminating communication between persons of different professions,
different beliefs, or different political convictions. Hence, carried to its
logical conclusion, the choice of "access" over "fairness" might well
lead to the use of broadcasting as a means of communication between
scientist and scientist, radical and radical, lawyer and lawyer; leaving
the remaining issues of common interest in the hands of profit-oriented
networks dedicated to the presentation of mindless banalities.
In the long run, "fairness" emerges, in spite of all its shortcomings,
as the best available means of insuring public debate over the airwaves. To be sure, its limitations are manifold, and its potential use
for the suppression of new and unorthodox views is a continuing
threat. It is unfortunate that the FCC has rejected suggestions that
fairness be supplemented by a limited right of access, especially in
counteradvertising and other areas where broadcasters' journalistic
interests are weak. As a further measure, it might be useful to require
broadcasters to adhere strictly to their affirmative obligation to offer
programming dealing with controversial issues. To eliminate the inherent arbitrariness built into the FCC's operating procedures, and to
reduce the government's role in the day-to-day affairs of its licensees, it
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would be advisable for the FCC to return to its pre-1962 practice of
reviewing the overall performance of the licensee at renewal time.182
With these modifications, the fairness doctrine could be the best
alternative for preserving the public's interest in the exchange of
divergent ideas.
An essential philosophical point remains to be considered. Throughout this Article, I have attempted to discover some of the aspects of
freedom by drawing a comparison between present reality as shaped
by the fairness doctrine and Mill's model for freedom. I have concluded that his model cannot be duplicated in modern times, and that
our best hope for freedom in the marketplace of ideas is only a
half freedom by Mill's criteria.
What of the argument that access can eventually duplicate the
model for freedom envisioned by Mill? Surely, as the number of
broadcasting outlets increases, all voices wanting to be heard should be
able to find an available outlet for their message. It must be remembered that freedom becomes a meaningful descriptive concept only
when applied to precisely delimited socio-political and philosophical
contexts.' 83 Throughout this inquiry, I have sought to appraise freedom within the context of present-day American society, approaching
modern reality from the standpoint of Mill's theory. This procedure
seemed justified because of the striking affinities which underlie both
present-day demand for a free marketplace of ideas and Mill's plea for
freedom of expression. Indeed, both Mill and American constitutional
interpretation share the view that it is the individual who must be the
subject of freedom, that he must be free from the imposition of
restraints which could curtail his ability to express his ideas, and that
he must be free to exchange his ideas with others in order to enrich his
mental capacities and thereby contribute to the formulation of the
common good. Underlying this view of freedom is the implicit assumption that the individual is possessed of the means necessary to engage
in a fruitful exchange of ideas. In other words, for freedom to be more
than a hollow illusion in this context, it is both necessary that
individuals have access to information, and that they be capable of
absorbing information made available to them. Mill underscored the
importance of individual access to information by proposing "the
greatest possible centralisation of information, and diffusion of it from
the centre,"' 184 and warned that concentration of power combined with
182.
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too little information would isolate the individual while allowing the
state to "dwarf its men."' 85 Paradoxically, today's individual runs
perhaps a greater risk of being dwarfed by too much information
which he cannot hope to absorb, than by a lack of access to available
information. Indeed, while it is true that concentration of power in
government and the private sector can lead to concerted efforts to
conceal information from the public, it is nevertheless also true that
the average citizen has never before had such an opportunity to
become exposed to the multiple sources of information that are available today. If the average individual remains isolated and dwarfed it is
primarily due to the increased specialization required by the ever more
complex organization of modern society, which demands that its
members devote most of their efforts to learning more and more about
smaller component parts of the whole structure. As areas of specialization become more remote from one another, inter-group communication
tends to decrease, while intra-group communication tends to establish
jargons which are incomprehensible to the outsider. In sum, as increasing specialization eliminates the remnants of Renaissance man, individuals can have all the available information at their disposal, and yet
remain in utter isolation from one another because they cannot understand each other.
As the dangers of too much incomprehensible information, coupled
with concentration of power in the hands of experts, become increasingly threatening to individual freedom, it can be easily understood
why fairness is, in the last analysis, more suited than "access" to serve
the ends suggested by the spirit of Mill's doctrine. Indeed, fairness
alone guarantees some measure of inter-group communication, and
provides some incentive for experts to translate their jargon into
plainer language so that they can be understood by the large audience
which they can reach. Moreover, by requiring that opposite views be
balanced, fairness reduces the risk of brainwashing by one-sided
presentations which the public might not otherwise suspect. Although
pro and con presentations of highly complex issues carry with them an
inherent risk of oversimplification and distortion, this need not operate
against the public interest if the distortions are neither substantial nor
misleading. Actually, oversimplification may often serve as a means of
conveying the main issues which emerge from complex and seemingly
puzzling problems, allowing the public to be a party to important
debate much as a jury is involved in the adversary confrontation of a
trial. Thus, in the long run, the public interest in broadcasting appears
185.
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better served by a half freedom which disseminates debate of the
crucial issues which affect the whole society, than a full freedom which
brings all ideas to all individuals, but which by the same token fails to
provide a common forum for mutual debate and mutual comprehension.

